Illegal Search and Seizure by Blanchard, Donald
Denver Law Review 
Volume 39 Issue 1 Article 5 
April 2021 
Illegal Search and Seizure 
Donald Blanchard 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Donald Blanchard, Illegal Search and Seizure, 39 Dicta 53 (1962). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1962
CASE COMMENTS
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
"We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmis-
sible in a state court." Mapp v. Ohio, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (U.S. 1961).
With those words the Supreme Court apparently extended the
protection of the fourth amendment to all persons standing trial-
whether in a federal or state court. The reasoning behind this ex-
tension is not considered here. The important result is that the
"federal rule," excluding illegally obtained evidence,' should now
be followed in state proceedings. Wolf v. Colorado2 is no longer the
law.
Superficially, the forceful prohibitions of the fourth amend-
ment appear to be clear and easily understood. Actually, their sub-
stance is far more complicated. Many questions are raised by each
clause, phrase, and even by each word. The decisions of the United
States Supreme Court will be discussed to illustrate outlines of
the federal rule; however, specific points may be supplemented by
reference to decisions of the courts of appeals and of the several
states. There is no dearth of this authority.
I. TESTS FOR LEGALITY
The discussion can be divided conveniently into three areas
created when the rules governing a lawful search and seizure were
formulated. A search (and seizure) is lawful when it is an incident
to a lawful arrest,3 or when made with a valid search warrant,4 or
if based upon "probable cause." 5 An examination of the cases in the
Court occurring in these areas provides a reasonably complete
examination of the problem.
A. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
Turning to the first ground upon which a search may be justi-
fied a question immediately arises as to the extent of the search.
A search removed from the place of arrest, and at a time subse-
quent thereto, is not lawfulY
It is apparent, however, that a search incident to a lawful arrest
need not be confined to the immediate area of the arrest. A thor-
ough search of a four-room apartment in which a defendant was
arrested was held to be lawful. 7 The search of an adjoining closet
or bathroom is lawful.' The general rule may be expressed in this
I See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In Wolf, the admissibility of illegally obtained enidence was held to be
discretionary w:th the states.
:1 Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957). United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
4 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5 Brinegar n. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
6 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Assuming a lawful arrest away from one's
house, an officer may not justify a concurrent search of a suspect's house without a warrant solely
on the grounds of belief that an article sought by the officer is in that house.
7 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
8 Marron e. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Abel e. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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way: a search incident to a lawful arrest may extend throughout
the premises over which defendant has effective and exclusive
control.9
Beyond this question of extent of the search incident to a law-
ful arrest, there are indications given by the Court that a search
and seizure may be unreasonable and hence unlawful if the
"wrong" things are seized, or if too much is seized. The Court sus-
tained the thorough search of a small apartment as a result of
which many draft cards were found, when in fact the officers were
searching for stolen checks. 10 However, this was apparently sanc-
tioned because the draft cards were small, like checks, and would
likely be hidden in the same places as checks-for example, in a
drawer." Disregarding the fact that possession of many draft cards
is a crime against the United States, and that their seizure might
be justified on this ground alone, it was pointed out that seizure
of such small unrelated articles would not be upheld if the officers
had been searching for something large, such as a stolen automobile
or an illegal distillery.
12
Mere evidentiary material not related to the offense for which
the arrest was made may not be seized. An arrest may not
be used as a pretext to search for evidence of guilt)13 The prosecu-
tion in a case may not justify the arrest by the search or, in turn,
the search by the arrest. There must be a valid basis for the arrest
prior to the search. 14 However, a person may not object if officers
seize "fruits" of crime such as stolen property, weapons, or articles
(the possession of which is a crime);15 furthermore, no objection
can be made where the articles implemented the crime. 16
In one case of "administrative arrest" (an arrest on a deporta-
tion warrant) the seizure of articles properly subject to seizure was
upheld, as was the seizure of some items which the suspect attempt-
ed to hide.17 From this case it may be inferred that officers may
search for weapons regardless of the offense for which the arrest
is made.
In addition to restrictions on the nature of the items seized, a
search incident to a lawful arrest may be unreasonable if too much
material is taken. The indiscriminate seizure of every item in a
defendant's house was held to be unlawful."i
There is another basis upon which evidence might be success-
fully suppressed in a given case. The Supreme Court has frequently
expressed an aversion to general or exploratory search." Such a
search might be characterized as a-"rummaging of the place," and
this has been held to be unreasonable.')
It seems that the protection of the fourth amendment extends
to one's automobile as well as to his home. Search on probable
cause may be more easily sustained in regard to an automobile than
9 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
10 Ibid.
11 Id. at 152.
12 Ibid.
13 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
14 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
15 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
16 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
17 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
18 Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
19 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
20 Go Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
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to a house, but as an incident to lawful arrest it appears that the
arrest must be valid before the search is made.
2 1
B. Search With a Valid Warrant
Turning to searches made with search warrants, it is clear that
the search is unreasonable if the warrant is invalid. The probable
cause upon which a search warrant will issue is not the same
"probable cause" needed to justify an arrest or search without a
warrant. Since it is not the function here to determine what is
probable cause, it is sufficient to say that if the requisite probable
cause is lacking a warrant may not properly issue, and a motion
to suppress should be sustained.
22
Since the fourth amendment requires that a search warrant
include a particular description of the things to be seized and the
place to be searched, either a procedure which is not specific, or
a search and seizure beyond the limits described, will render the
search and seizure unlawful.
A recent case illustrates the first aspect above. A search war-
rant, properly issued in regard to probable cause and supported by
oath, but describing the material to be seized only as "obscene" was
held to be invalid.2 3 The difficulty, of course, is apparent when one
considers who is to determine what is "obscene" when the warrantl
is executed. The Supreme Court held that here there was not a.
particular description of the things to be seized, made after a
judicial determination; rather, there was a warrant allowing the
executing officer to determine himself what was or was not ob-
scene.
2 4
In an interesting case, entry to defendant's premises was law-
fully gained with a search warrant. The items particularly described
in the warrant and subject to seizure were certain "essential" items
(such as liquor) for conducting an illegal saloon business. Upon
entering the premises, the officers observed one of the defendants
in the act of illegally serving liquor, and for this they arrested him.
As an incident to this lawful arrest, the officers then searched for
21 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
22 U.S. Const. amend. IV. " . . . . and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons.
or thinqs to be seized."
23 Marcus v. Search Warrants, Etc., 81 S.Ct. 1708 (U.S. 1961).
24 Id. at 1716.
25 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
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and seized items not described in the warrant. The search was
upheld in spite of this.
25
With regard to the particular description of the place to be
searched required by the fourth amendment, there has been no
delineation of bounds by the Supreme Court. Perhaps the require-
ment is self-explanatory, but it appears that problems will arise
as to searches made of basements and storerooms properly used by
many persons-as in apartment houses, and various outbuildings
such as garages.
Thus, what types of premises are protected against unlawful
searches? The fourth amendment uses the word "houses." That this
word has a broad meaning is readily demonstrated in the cases
examined.
A hotel room may be a person's house,26 as well as a room (or
rooms) in a rooming house. However, in these cases the protection
does not extend to common areas such as hallways. In fact, the
occupant of a single room may not be able to successfully object
to the unlawful, forceful entry into the rooming house itself.27 A
store or office will receive the protection of the fourth amendment,28
although there is some indication that premises open to the public
will not be treated with the same consideration as a private resi-
dence. 29 The property of a corporation is protected in its offices.
30
The protection of the fourth amendment extends to rented build-
ings, and the consent of the owner will not be sufficient to justify
a search of premises rented to someone else.3' Whenever the prem-
ises are' fixed and permanent, only the greatest necessity will abro-
gate the requirement that officers obtain a search warrant before
entering.
32
The protection afforded to movable premises may not be as
great as that given homes, but it does apply as indicated in many
cases involving automobiles.
33
One more factor deserves mention in this discussion of search
with a warrant. The Supreme Court has held that a warrant issued
for a daylight search will not sustain a later search at night;34 the
essential purpose of the fourth amendment is to shield the citizen
26 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
2T McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 145 (1948).
28 Gouled v. United States, 225 U.S. 298 (1921).
29 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1960).
30 Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
31 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
32 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
33 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
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from unwarranted intrusion into his privacy.35 Before a night search
will be justified, the search warrant must provide for such time of
search.
C. Search Made With Probable Cause
The general rule that a search (and seizure) is lawful when
made upon "probable cause" is easily stated. Its application is quite
a different matter. It appears that a case by case determination
will be made in the future as has been done in the past.
It has been said that "probable cause ' 36 is more than mere
suspicion but less than actual evidence to prove guilt.3 The officer
who wishes to search premises will not be able to do so, lawfully,
if his belief that a felony is being committed is not reasonable and
not founded upon facts within his knowledge. A sharper definition
of this concept must be made on the facts in future cases. The
Supreme Court has indicated that prior arrests, a suspect's reputa-
tion, an attempted escape by a suspect when approached by offi-
cers, prior illegal use of premises, tips by reliable informants,3
recent and repeated suspicious conduct, 39 or actual observation of
felonious activity,40 have provided the requisite elements of prob-
able cause to search without a warrant.
In spite of the existence of probable cause, evidence may be
seized in an unlawful way and may be subject to suppression if
the officer making the search had an opportunity to obtain -a war-
rant and did not do so. Mere inconvenience and delay will not
excuse the requirement of a search warrant.41 This is especially
Irue where the premises to be searched are permanent, or where
there is no probability of removal, destruction of evidence, or other
threatened change. 42 Surveillance for a period of time may negate
a showing of probable cause: if a search warrant could not be
obtained after a period of surveillance it would seem that the
stronger grounds required to sustain a search on probable cause
would also be lacking.
43
A word of caution, regarding motions to suppress evidence
illegally obtained and for return of the property so seized, may be
inserted here. The Supreme Court declined to decide whether or
not probable cause to search without a warrant was present because
the issue was not raised in advance of trial when opportunity was
given. 44 In any case seasonable objection to the production of the
evidence must be made.
4 5
Four illustrations of illegal search and seizure do not seem to
fall conveniently into the three categories above, but they are
important to consider.
First, evidence obtained by means of a listening device part of
which unlawfully comes into physical contact with defendant's
34 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 500 (1958).
:5 Id. at 497.
30 I.e., probable cause to believe a felony is being committed or has been committed.
37 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
38 See Husty -. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
39 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
40 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
41 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
42 See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Johnson v. United States, supra note 41.
43 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 145 (1948).
44 Segurolo v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927).
45 Id. at 112.
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premises may be suppressed on the grounds of an illegal search and
seizure.
46
Second, the Supreme Court has held that a search by an offi-
cer (on this occasion an undercover agent) surreptitiously made
after a lawful entry gained as a result of a business or social call,
or after an entry gained by stealth, would violate the fourth amend-
ment.
47
Third, if officers gain entry by dqmand, and it is granted in
deference to their authority, such entry may be held illegal because
of the implied coercion flowing from this authority.
48
Finally, there would appear to be an important consideration
involved in deciding who may consent to a search of premises upon
demand made by officers.49 Entry by coercion may well vitiate con-
sent as indicated above; and although no case was found on the
point it would seem that consent could not be effective if in fact
the person consenting did not understand the language of the
officers, and hence misunderstood their meaning.
II. WHO MAY SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
The standing of a person to move to suppress evidence illegal-
ly obtained has received recent comment by the Court. Earlier
cases, .basing the defendant's standing to object on a proprietary
interest in the things seized or upon the amount of control exer-
cised over the premises, may now be open to serious question. No
longer will the Court base such distinctions on the niceties of tort
law; it appears that anyone legitimately on the premises may object
to the unlawful seizure of property therefrom.50 The Supreme Court
has also pointed out that the possession of narcotics charged by
the government, but denied by the defendant, nonetheless gives the
defendant the requisite standing to move to suppress evidence
illegally seized.51
CONCLUSION
Upon a thorough reading of the cases it is apparent that each
decision depends upon its peculiar facts.52 In the area of probable
cause-that needed to obtain a warrant, and that needed to sustain
a search without a warrant-one can hardly formulate any definite
rules. The same situation exists when the question of lawful arrest
arises.
It appears in these cases that the Supreme Court is leaning
toward a stricter enforcement of the constitutional guaranties. As
pointed out in many cases the fourth amendment protects only
against unreasonable searches. So, an argument would seem strong-
est when based directly upon the unreasonableness of the conduct
of the searching officers. If the Court finds a search to be unreason-
able, evidence obtained thereby will be illegal, and the rule of
Mapp v. Ohio excluding such evidence in both federal and state
courts will apply. Donald Blanchard
46 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
47 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
48 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
411 Two cases from the courts of appeals may be referred to regarding consent given to a search
by the wife of defendant, United States v. Heine, 149 F.2d 485 (1945); or by the superintendent of
defendant's apartment building, Reszutek v. United States, 147 F.2d 142 (1945).
50 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
51 Ibid.
52 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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